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Reforming the structure  of direct taxation: the political  and administrative   response 
to the Meade Report(1978). 
 
 
 
 
 
History   suggests   that what   is not ‘politically  possible’  can change   quite radically and 
quite  rapidly over the years ; and  nothing can become politically   possible  unless it is   first 
proposed  and discussed   by some    body of persons.’  (The Structure and Reform of Direct  
Taxation(The Meade Report), p. 5) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article uses the archives of government departments, political parties and individual 
politicians and economists to examine the political and administrative reception of the Meade 
Report published in 1978. It analyses the differing responses to those sections of the report 
recommending the promotion of incentives to work and save, compared with those 
recommendations for a lifetime expenditure tax and the taxation of the transfer and 
inheritance of wealth.  It locates the Conservative Thatcher governments’ opposition to the 
proposals for the taxation of wealth in the wider political-economic context of the time. 
These differences between now and then are also reflected in the differing weight given to 
considerations of taxable capacity and optimal tax theory in the Meade Report and Mirrlees 
Review respectively. Concerned that the Mirrlees Review does not suffer the cherry-picking 
fate of the Meade Report or, worse, of simple benign neglect by government, the article 
draws attention to the factors affecting the political reception of such reports, but ends, 
paradoxically, by suggesting that given the current political concern with the taxation of 
wealth, the Meade Report may have at least as much to offer on this issue as does the 
Mirrlees Review.  
 
 
JEL Classification: A11; B25; B31; H20; N34; 
 
 
 
 The publication of Tax By Design: The Mirrlees Review on 13th September 2011 was the 
first major review of the system of direct taxation since the publication of  the Meade Report 
on The Structure and Reform of Direct  Taxation on 26th  January 1978.1 Both reviews were 
published at a time of economic  change, the Meade  Report as inflation began to mutate into 
stagflation, and the Mirrlees Review as the domestic economy remained in intensive care 
following the crash of September 2008.  The Meade committee was established by the 
Institute for  Fiscal Studies in 1975 in frustration  at  ministerial  rejection  of calls   from the  
Sandilands Committee and others for a Royal  Commission   on the whole of the taxation 
system.2 The Sandilands Committee had worked on the problem of inflation accounting and 
there was a  widespread   view that years of ad hoc  modifications to taxes  had resulted in a 
                                                 
1 TNA T364/149 (1978c) 
2 TNA T364/149 (1977b),  paras. 23, 24, 29,  32.  
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system whose   anomalies and  inconsistencies   were intensified by inflation.3  To 
inconsistencies could be added a concern that the existing tax system was providing 
insufficient   incentives to work   and to make lifetime savings.  As such, these concerns 
spanned different time perspectives.  The concerns   with incentives    to work were of the 
present; those with consumption-smoothing through life-time saving were projected into the 
future. Similarly, viewed   over a  longer period, an interest in rewarding   effort and   
increasing opportunity   raised the question   of how accumulated   wealth should be treated 
and what, if any, distinction   should be made between  wealth that was inherited  or earned 
by the individual.   Philosophically   drawn to taxing   what an individual    took out of an   
economy(expenditure) rather than what the individual put in(income), and preferring to view 
issues  of income and expenditure  over the lifetime   of the individual, a major  
recommendation   of the Meade Report  was for the adoption of a lifetime  expenditure tax. A 
transition period of around 10 years   was envisaged for this shift away  from income-based 
taxation. The shift to an expenditure tax was to be accompanied by capital taxes, which 
included proposals for a progressive accession tax based on the cumulative value of inherited 
wealth and the likely duration of its possession by the donee. Tax, partly as a proxy for public 
expenditure, was a central issue of political debate in the 1979 general election which 
resulted in Margaret Thatcher becoming Prime Minister.  Yet as one of the Meade Committee 
members, John Kay, remarked in  Fiscal Studies in July 1980, in that general election in 
which ‘tax was a major   issue’, the Meade Report ‘was barely mentioned’.4 This was not 
benign neglect, since the unacknowledged introduction of some of the Report’s 
recommendations was trumpeted by the Thatcher governments; equally, others were 
aggressively rejected. The purpose of this article is to analyse the political and administrative 
(Treasury, Inland Revenue)   reception of the Meade Report and to shed light on why some 
but not all of its recommendations   were implemented by the government.  The research uses 
the archives of the Labour Party, the Conservative party, the Inland Revenue, Treasury, and 
of Margaret Thatcher and James Meade. While focussing on the reception of the Meade 
Report, the article also ruminates from this historical perspective on factors which may affect 
the reception of the Mirrlees Review. In particular, the article emphasises  the importance of 
the political context and climate into which reviews are published, arguing that both the 
Meade and Mirrlees reviews suffered from being published at a time when an albeit inchoate 
public mood regarding the distribution of wealth was changing. Paradoxically, the ideas of 
Meade on the treatment of wealth may be more in step with current public opinion than those 
of Mirrlees.  
 
Inconsistencies 
 
       Although the Meade Report made major recommendations for a ‘new Beveridge’ social 
dividend scheme and for a flow-of-funds corporation tax, this article will confine its attention 
to the proposals  for an expenditure tax and for capital taxes. While the proposals   for 
corporation tax were allied with moves towards an  expenditure base of taxation, the proposal 
for a special dividend scheme was so fundamental, as well as contentious within the Meade 
Committee itself, as to merit an article to itself. In concentrating on the proposals for 
expenditure and capital taxation, the article is organised around the three themes of   
inconsistencies,   incentives   and wealth.  Beginning with inconsistencies, these 
fundamentally arose from the interaction of income and expenditure taxes within the existing 
ostensibly income-based system. The discriminatory tax treatment of savings was one 
                                                 
3 IFS (1978)p. 3. 
4 Kay (1980), p. 47. 
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obvious example.5 Contributions to pensions, life insurance policies, investments in capital 
assets with 100% capital allowances were tax-exempt but not contributions to  building 
society savings accounts. Income from building societies was then taxed again (double 
taxation). Capital gains when taxed were done so at rates lower than the higher income tax 
rates, and with the abolition of Schedule A in 1963 homeowners could keep all of the capital 
gain on their principal property while also not paying any tax on the imputed income from its 
occupation. In an economy seeking to encourage saving, the interaction of exemptions and 
taxes could produce varying net returns on the same investments.6  Differing interactions of 
income, corporation and  capital gains   taxes  could result in  an asset yielding  a 10%  real 
rate of return  producing a post-tax rate of return   to the saver ranging from 20% to 59% .7 
      In noting such inconsistencies, the Meade Committee, had it known, would have found 
itself in line with thinking in the Conservative party. Throughout its lifetime, the work of the 
Meade   Committee was tracked by the Conservative Party Taxation committee chaired by   
David Howell and that   committee   was concerned with many of the same inconsistencies.8   
When subsequently in government  from May 1979,  the Thatcher government  introduced   
reforms  so as to   allow most life-cycle  savings to  qualify   for expenditure   tax treatment.9 
In 1987 the Personal Equity Plan was introduced and in 1991 its successor   the Tax-Exempt 
Special Savings Account(TESSA). In 1988, personal pensions were introduced  which 
enjoyed   the same tax relief   on contributions,  fund income   and withdrawals as employer-
based occupational pensions.10 
 
Incentives 
 
     As on inconsistencies, so too on incentives, there was often common ground between the 
Meade Report and the Conservative party and later Thatcher governments. Formally, the 
Meade Report addressed the  ‘income effect’   and the ‘substitution effect’ of a tax burden, 
income effects being viewed as the most effective   way of meeting   the inevitable   costs of 
given tax burdens, but ‘substitution effects’ being an indication   of economic inefficiencies   
and wastes, even if they did  no more than offset the  influence of the ‘income effects’.11 On 
its publication   in 1978 the Meade Report  was ahead   of Conservative party    thinking on 
the   substitution effect   of  marginal rates   of taxation, and in a letter to Geoffrey Howe, Mrs 
Thatcher’s   first Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1979,  Meade emphasised the report’s  
concern to see a reduction in the marginal rate of income tax at both ends of the income tax 
range from their  “present absurd  levels”. 12 At the top end the Meade Report favoured a top 
rate of income tax of 70% rather than the existing  98%, a rate   which it could attain as an 
investment  income surcharge  of 15% was added to the existing top marginal rate of 83%.13  
Not only at the taxable margin, but also in its discussion  of incentives in general, the Meade  
Report was ahead of the Conservative party. Meade’s hope of “an upsurge of private   
initiative and enterprise” in 1977 might be    contrasted   with the timidity   of the 
                                                 
5 TNA T366/205 (1977b), para 7 
6 Brown, Bird and King (1978),  p. 6.    
7 TNA T366/205 (1977)d, paras. 12, 14 
8 THCR 2/6/1/36 (1977) 
THCR 2/6/1/27 (1975) 
9 Adams, Browne and Heady (2010) 
Banks and Diamond (2010) 
10 Adams, Browne and Heady (2010) 
Banks and Diamond (2010) 
11 IFS (1978), p. 8 
12 Meade 6/2 (1977a) 
13 THCR 2/6/1/35 (1975) 
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Conservative Taxation   committee in December 1975.14  The Conservatives were   nervous 
of making general use of the vocabulary of “incentives”,  this “standby  of past Conservative   
Governments”,  since “we  are aware   that it is difficult    to make a cast-iron  academic case 
for it” and that   it would be difficult   for any “future  Conservative Chancellor, however 
much a man of steel,  to argue, say for massive   cuts on social  services  and wage  restraint   
while at the same time   awarding a ‘payrise’ to many executives   just to make them work 
harder”. 15 
      At the time of the Meade Committee’s deliberations, the issues of incentives and   
fairness which underpinned   the political economy of taxation were the focus of a lively 
academic discussion.  In 1971, John Rawls’s book A Theory of Justice and James Mirrlees 
articles on optimal taxation were published.16 The results of Mirrlees’ work on the elasticity 
of work effort in relation to the marginal   rate of taxation surprised even himself: ‘I had 
expected   the rigorous   analysis   of income taxation in the utilitarian manner   to provide an 
argument   for high tax rates’.17 Appropriately   given the    contributions which   both Rawls 
and Mirrlees   made to the   fundamental reassessment   of utilitarianism, both Mirrlees and 
Rawls later contributed to Utilitarianism and  Beyond edited by the economist  Amartya Sen 
and the philosopher Bernard Williams.18 The debate on marginal incentives, basic contractual 
rights and the implications   for the structure of taxation was closely followed from early on 
by the Treasury.  In August 1975 the Treasury’s Rachel Lomax wrote a paper surveying the 
work on tax structures and theories of redistribution of Mirrlees,  Feldstein, Atkinson , Fair 
and Rawls, although, quoting Abba Lerner,  sometimes she found the ‘mathematical 
virtuosity’ of the papers made them ‘more competent than   comprehensible’.19 However the 
main points concerning the individual’s work/leisure   choice were clearly taken, and Lomax 
thought that even Rawls’s mini-max approach implied ‘marginal tax rates   well below  100% 
(in the region of  30-45%)   on the assumption of  ‘plausible’ (constant) non zero labour 
supply elasticities’. 20 The Treasury also kept abreast of progress in the Meade Committee. 
The Treasury’s Douglas Todd had followed the committee’s   work almost from its inception.  
Todd, who had previously been senior economic adviser  at the Monopolies Commission, had 
met Donald Ironside, Deputy Chairmen of the Meade Committee, in Bath in the autumn of 
1976, Ironside had told Meade of Todd’s interest, and Meade had subsequently sent him 
‘fragments’ of ‘preliminary drafts’ of the Report.21 In developing a medium-term tax 
strategy, the Treasury made use of the work of the Meade Committee as well as its own 
internal research such as that undertaken by Lomax, its commissioned research from 
Professor C. Brown at Stirling University on income and substitution effects of tax changes, 
and  an IFS   project led by  W. Reddaway on the incentive effect of marginal tax rates  on 
high income earners. 22   These varied sources all fed   into the Treasury’s five-year  Medium 
                                                 
14 Meade 6/2 (1977a) 
15 THCR 2/6/1/35 (1975) 
16 Rawls (1971) 
Mirrlees (1971) 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971 a and b) 
17 Atkinson(1977a) 
18 Mirrlees (1982) 
19 Atkinson (1977a); Atkinson and Stiglitz, (1972); Diamond and Mirrlees, (March 1971) (June 1971); Fair 
(1971); Feldstein (March 1972) (April 1972) (November 1973); Mirrlees (1971); Rawls (1974) 
20 TNA T171/1442 (1975) 
21 TNA T366/205 (1976a), Letter, Meade to Todd, 4th October  1976 
Ironside was a Visiting Fellow  at the University of Bath where C.T. Sandford was Professor of Political 
Economy. 
Todd (1971) 
22 TNA T366/380 (1978b)  
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Term  Tax Strategy   which by 1978  was prioritising ‘improving incentives’ and proposing 
that  the top rate of taxation be reduced from 83 per cent to 75 per cent and the basic rate of 
income tax   to 32%.23  Any such income tax   reductions would be financed by an increase in 
VAT over the medium term.  
 
Wealth 
 
       Within the Treasury and the Conservative Party, the Meade Report’s interest in 
improving incentives at either end of the income scale found receptive audiences.  James 
Meade’s personal commitment to reinvigorating the economy was made perfectly clear, 
being starkly stated in a personal prefatory note to the Report: 
 
‘Our Report   is a joint effort, but I take this opportunity   of expressing a personal view.  Our 
economy has become too stagnant; restoration of standards of living and many desirable 
increases in economic welfare depend upon higher productivity.’ 
 
However, Meade’s next sentence was: 
 
 ‘At the same time a modern humane society   demands that effective action   should be taken   
to prevent poverty   and to remove ‘unacceptable inequalities of opportunity, wealth and 
privilege.’ 24  
 
      The Report’s proposals for prevention of poverty are not the concern of this paper. It was 
the proposals to remove ‘unacceptable inequalities of opportunity, wealth and privilege’25 
which were to reveal major differences of thinking between   the Meade Committee and the 
Conservative party and subsequent Thatcher governments. For James Meade, the concern to 
redistribute wealth and property, and to weaken concentrations of power so as to encourage a 
more open and socially   mobile   society, was a constant   throughout his writings. His books, 
Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property (1964) with its chapter on ‘A property-
owning democracy’, The Intelligent   Radical’s Guide to Economic Policy(1975), and  The 
Just Economy(1976)26 attest to this persistent concern with securing a just  distribution   of 
opportunity and wealth.  Like R.H.Tawney, Meade distinguished between wealth and income 
and he shared Tawney’s view that what was ‘repulsive’ was not income inequality but that 
“some classes should be excluded from the heritage of civilization which others enjoy’.27 
Wealth allowed ‘access’, it produced ‘an income   which, unlike  earning capacity, does not 
decline with   age and is not gained   at the expense of leisure’ and the possession of wealth 
conferred independence, security and influence’.28 Meade had no wish   to diminish 
incentives   to earn income which accumulated as wealth. Rather, his main concern was to tax   
the use of wealth rather than the possession of wealth itself, and to distinguish   between 
those cases where wealth had been earned  by the individual and those where it had been 
inherited. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fieghen and Reddaway (1981) 
23 Meade 6/2 (1977a) 
24 IFS (1978), p. xv. 
25 Op. cit.. 
26 Meade (1964), chapter 5. 
Meade(1976). 
Meade (1975). 
27 Kymlicka (2006), p. 13. 
Tawney (1964), p. 113.    
28 IFS (1978), pp. 317-318. 
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      One year before the establishment   of the Meade Committee (Meade himself began   
work in July   1975   and the Committee started officially   in October   1975) 29, long-
standing calls for a Wealth Tax had resulted   in its inclusion in the   Labour Party election 
manifesto for the February   1974 general election. However although a Green Paper on a 
Wealth Tax was published in August 1974 and a Select Committee   reported on the topic   in 
August 1975, the inability of the Select Committee   to agree on a majority report (it 
published five draft reports) led the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, on   18th 
December 1975 to announce that he was postponing the   introduction of a wealth tax.  By 
this time the Inland Revenue in 1972 had prepared a Green Paper on the related issue of 
inheritance tax and on 24th September   1973 an IFS-sponsored book , An Accessions Tax by 
Sandford , Willis and   Ironside had argued for a cumulative   tax on transfers   of property by 
gift   inter vivos   or on death,   graduated according   to the taxable accessions   of the   
recipients  from all sources. 30  Thus, when the Meade Committee began   its meetings, ideas 
for a Wealth Tax   had run into   the parliamentary   sand, while ideas   for an accession tax   
were bubbling away at the IFS. The Meade Committee’s approach to the taxation   of wealth 
was two-fold.  The first approach  involved a move   towards a progressive   expenditure   tax 
which by exempting savings  and investment from taxation  might encourage  lifetime 
consumption-smoothing, economic  growth and development, but   which would also charge 
those who lived  at a high level of consumption, whether  from a high income  or by the 
dissipation of capital wealth.  Variations on this theme involved a two-tier expenditure tax   
with a surcharge on levels of expenditure   above the basic rate band.  Such an approach had 
its most notable previous published exposition in 1955 in Kaldor’s  An Expenditure   Tax. 
Indeed, in thanking   Meade for sending   him a copy   of the Meade Committee report, 
Kaldor “found it very gratifying  that you advocate   an Expenditure Tax  on much the same 
lines as I  did when I wrote my  book 23 years ago!’31  
      The second strand of the Meade Committee’s approach to the taxation    of wealth 
concerned   the treatment of transfers and inheritance during or after the donor’s life. 
Whereas an Annual Wealth Tax   could fall on wealth   resulting from an individual’s   own 
effort and saving, taxes on capital transfers   could be checked   so as to fall on the 
inheritance and receipt, rather than on the accumulation, of wealth.  The Meade Committee’s 
ideas crystallised around PAWAT(Progressive Annual Wealth Accessions Tax), which taxed 
both the  transfer of wealth and the likely duration of its possession. Tax was levied on the 
donee (as the beneficiary) rather than the donor at a progressive rate depending   not only on 
the cumulative amount of gifts already received, but also on the age of the donee.  Assuming 
that the donee would live to be 85, a lump-sum advance payment   would be charged, this 
being   proportionately refunded if the wealth was not enjoyed until the age   of 85.  
      In the wake of   the parliamentary death of   efforts to introduce   an Annual Wealth Tax, 
on 15th and 16th February 1977 Meade sent draft copies   of Chapter XII (eventually chapters 
15 and 16 of the final report) on Capital Transfer Taxes to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Denis Healey and to Douglas Jay, a long-time campaigner for the taxation of wealth, 
respectively.  While Meade   admitted to Jay that the chapter on capital transfer taxes with its 
“form   of a lump-sum advance of a progressive   annual wealth tax” might “sound   at first 
rather gimmicky’, nevertheless he thought that it could ‘both politically   and economically   
serve the main ends of an annual   wealth   tax without many of the difficulties of the 
latter”.32 While Healey appreciated   that the proposal   for an accessions   tax was “an 
                                                 
29 TNA T366/4, (1975), para 2. 
30 TNA IR40/18139 (1973) 
Sandford, Willis and Ironside (1973).   
31 Meade  6/11 (1977) 
32 Meade 6/10 (1977b) 
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ingenious   way of marrying   a tax   on the transfer   of wealth with a tax   on holding wealth   
in an attempt   to encourage redistribution without sapping initiative”, he reminded Meade 
that the   government had dropped plans for a wealth tax   in the current Parliament because 
“our   social objectives   have at present   to take second place   to our wider   economic and   
industrial priorities”. 33 
      Meade also took his ideas   to Conservative politicians, notably to a meeting   organised 
by Geoffrey Howe on 22nd November 1977. This proved to be a ‘disastrous meeting’ with 
Meade struggling to present ‘an orderly summary of our conclusions’ and battling against a 
hostile “misconception” that “we were proposing massive and sudden changes in the tax 
structure”.34 Meade subsequently wrote to Howe expressing his “surprise at the unmitigated   
hostility shown   by the majority of your group”.35 While Howe acknowledged that “the 
meeting   started off   from the difficulty   that none   of us had  seen your document   and 
only two   or three   the first draft – and that some months   ago”, his main   defence was that 
“unmitigated hostility”  was “not the real spirit   of our reaction” but rather a “political 
abhorrence, born   of many Finance   Bill Standing   Committees,   of anything   which 
involved   complex   replacement   of  familiar fiscal machinery   when simplification   and 
adaptation , of course, on a basis of principle, would do as well”.36 By way of an olive branch  
to Meade, Howe commended  to him chapter 3   of the Conservative Party’s   recently 
published   pamphlet The Right Approach to the Economy,  as well as Howe’s own   recent 
talk   to the Addington Society   which was reprinted  in that year’s   British Tax Review. 37  
Yet such niceties could not conceal the fundamental difference of view between the Meade   
Report   and the Conservative Party over the taxation of wealth. In correspondence with  
Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph, Howe referred   to Meade as a ‘socialist’38  and while 
Meade might prefer   the appellation   of ‘liberal-socialist’ he would  probably not have 
dissented from Crosland’s  view in 1956   that “the largest  inequalities   stem  not from   the 
redistribution   of earned incomes, but from the ownership  of inherited capital’.39 Tellingly, 
in his correspondence with Meade, Howe was careful to distinguish between the Meade 
Report’s interest in a lifetime expenditure tax and the Conservatives’ interest in a “switch   to 
indirect taxation   which is not, of course,   the same  as a switch   to an expenditure   tax”.40 
 
Implementation 
 
      While the Conservative government   was willing to introduce tax relief on lifetime 
savings, essentially on an expenditure tax basis, it was resolutely opposed   to making   a 
similar adjustment   in its approach   to revenue-raising. The new Thatcher   government did 
initiate a sharp shift from direct to  indirect taxation, but this was on expenditure   on a 
current, not a lifetime, basis. Emboldened by her Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, in 1979 
Margaret Thatcher approved a sharp shift between direct and indirect taxation as VAT rose 
from 8% to 15% while the basic rate of income tax was cut from 33% to 30% in the 
government’s first Budget   in June 1979. Further cuts were to follow as the basic rate of 
income   tax was cut   to 29% in 1986, 27% in 1987, and 25% in 1988. Cuts were also made 
                                                                                                                                                        
Daunton (2002), p.213 
33 Meade 6/10 (1977c)  
34 Meade 6/2 (1977c) 
35 Meade 6/2 (1977a)   
36 Meade 6/2 (1977b) 
37 Howe (1977a) 
Howe (1977b)   
38 Meade (1964) 
39 Phelps Brown, (1988), p. 343. 
40 Meade 6/2 (1977b)   
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to higher   tax rates, from 83% to 60% in  June 1979 and from 60% to 40% in 1988.While 
between 1978-9 and 2007-8 reliance   on indirect   taxes   only increased a little  from 23% to 
25%, of the source  of revenue   the proportion   of VAT  rose substantially   from 9% to 16% 
of total tax revenue. Excises on alcohol and tobacco each fell from around 4% to about 1.5%  
of the total.41 In revenue-raising, there was a strong shift   towards the rise of VAT, which 
doubled its   share of tax revenue between   1979 and   2009. 
      In taxing expenditure but in rejecting calls   for a move to a lifetime expenditure tax, the 
Thatcher governments could build on the long-standing opposition of the Inland Revenue. 
While the Meade Report’s approach to incentives   found receptive audiences   in the 
Treasury and the Conservative Party, talk of an expenditure tax   drew vehement opposition 
from the Inland Revenue. This was not a knee-jerk response. The Inland Revenue produced a 
79-page   internal review of the proposal for an expenditure tax, drawing unflattering    
comparisons with the short   and unsuccessful attempt to introduce an expenditure tax   in Sri 
Lanka (then Ceylon) and India   and invoking criticisms previously   made   of Kaldor’s  An 
Expenditure Tax by   such economists as Vickrey and Prest. 42 Yet, the Inland Revenue’s  
central objection   to the Meade Report  was not in fact to its economic arguments  for an 
expenditure tax, although it did not find those arguments ‘wholly compelling’,  but rather to 
the ‘great practical difficulties’, to some of ‘which   we see no satisfactory  answer’ of 
introducing and administering an expenditure tax. The Revenue emphasised the  benefits of 
operating a comprehensive  cumulative PAYE   system in which the majority of taxpayers 
did not submit annual returns, identifying as a ‘major stumbling block’   with a universal 
expenditure tax  the  “need to get  an annual return from   everyone’.43 The Revenue’s stance 
was   to defend the existing system, and even to defend pre-existing proposals    for reform. 
Noting the inconsistencies identified by the Meade committee, the Revenue argued at one and 
the same time that these could be addressed within the existing system and that such 
inconsistencies reflected “deliberate policy decisions   in response    to the different   and 
often   conflicting   political and economic   pressures of the last generation or so”. 44 If the 
taxation of wealth was to change the Revenue was not prepared   to support PAWAT   but 
instead   preferred   that the Labour government proposals   for a Wealth Tax   be revived   
since it would be less   work to return to a tax broadly along the same lines of the Green 
Paper. 45  
      What was striking about the Inland Revenue’s opposition to the   Meade Report   was not 
that   it should oppose   its administrative implications, but the venom of its opposition within 
the government administration. The Revenue was damning in its judgement on the Meade 
Committee’s work:  “The Report is   disappointing: its original proposals are not practicable, 
and its   practicable   proposals are   not original”. 46 This stance drew strong objections from 
the Treasury which criticised the Revenue’s condemnation of “the Report as   entirely 
irrelevant   and useless” observing that while it was always “easy to do a hatchet job  on a 
theoretical analysis of this kind”, there was a wide recognition that  the  tax system was 
“urgently in need of reform”. They also questioned why, if the Report was “as way out   and 
as irrelevant as the Revenue   seems to imply”, the Revenue had not sought to “to influence    
                                                 
41 Besley et al. (2010), p. 276. 
42 Meade 10/17 (1978a),  para. 7. 
Meade 10/17 (1980b) 
Musgrave (1959), Shoup (1969), Prest (1956, 1959, 1960), Vickrey (1957) 
43 Meade 10/17 (1978a),  paras. A3, D3-4. 
Kaldor, N (1955) 
44 TNA T364/149 (1977b),  para. 21. 
45 TNA T366/205 (1977c),  paras. 3, 6. 
46 TNA T364/149 (1977b),  paras. 23, 24, 29,  32.  
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the course and approach  of the exercise at an early stage” since the Meade Committee had 
done “their best   to keep us   fully informed   of the lines   on which they were working , and 
officials   participated   in their decisions   from time to time”.47 
      If within  the machinery of government, the opposition   of the Inland Revenue   to central 
features  of the Meade Report was based on  administrative, rather than economic, 
considerations, then, in similar  fashion, the  objections   of the Conservative  party and 
government to sections of the Meade  Report were political rather than economic. 
Fundamentally the Conservative Party was   committed to reducing the taxation of wealth and 
its transfer. While the Conservative Taxation Committee may have been cautious in the mid-
1970s in using the vocabulary of incentives, it was forthright in its determination to end the 
‘political’ taxation of the rich, particularly through capital transfer   tax’.48 This formed a 
fault line   between the Meade Committee    and the incoming   Conservative government.  In 
part, it reflected a wider political re-evaluation of the role of government, the scope of public 
expenditure and the pursuit of ‘normative’ aims such as the redistribution of income and 
wealth. For Keith Joseph in 1979, not only was redistribution ‘unwise’, but it was also 
‘morally indefensible, misconceived in theory and repellent in practice’.49 Part of the 
argument over the taxation of wealth concerned the issues of entitlement and the efficiency of 
market outcomes.  Meade’s preference, like Rawls and Hayek, was to emphasise the role of 
luck and the 'self-reinforcing influences which help to sustain the good fortune of the 
fortunate and the bad fortune of the unfortunate'. 50  Aside from luck, if talent caused an 
individual to prosper the political philosophical question arose of the extent   to which an 
individual ‘owned’ the beneficial proceeds   of his/her talents. Here again there was common 
ground between Meade, Hayek and Rawls. Hayek thought that “the inborn as well as the 
acquired   gifts of a person clearly have a value to his fellows   which does not depend on any 
credit   due to him for possessing them”.51  For Rawls, his Difference Principle  represented, 
in effect, an agreement   to regard the distribution   of natural talents  as a common asset.52 If 
the principle was the redress of undeserved inequalities, then it was consistent to argue for a 
redistribution of resources to mitigate the intergenerational transfer of relative advantage.  
Although Hayek objected   to Rawls’s use of the term ‘social justice’, he welcomed his 
argument that   rather than a  particular   system or   distribution  being designated as ‘just’, it 
was   the  principles of justice   which defined “the crucial   constraints   which institutions  
and joint  activities must  satisfy  if persons engaging  in them are to have   no complaints 
against them”.53    
      In the political context of the late 1970s and 1980s, the Meade Report’s  PAWAT 
proposal looked increasingly out of step with Conservative philosophy and policy. While the 
Thatcher governments acted to offer tax-relief on life-cycle  savings and to continue the 
erosion of Mortgage Interest Tax Relief (finally abolished in  April 2000)54, the disparity 
between these tax reforms concerning expenditure and the protection of house-owners from 
capital gains tax on their principal residence, was consistent with the generally different 
treatment of  the stock of wealth and the flow of expenditure.  By the time of the 
government’s decision in March 1988   to reduce the top rate   of income  tax   from 60% to 
                                                 
47 TNA T364/149 (1977a), para. 5. 
48 THCR 2/6/1/36 (1977) 
THCR 2/6/1/35 (1975) 
49 Joseph (1979), p. 19. 
50 Meade (1976),  p.155. 
Atkinson (1997b) 
51 Hayek (1960), p. 81. 
52 Rawls  (1971) pp 101-2. 
53 Hayek (1976), p. 100. 
54 Besley et al (2010), p. 20. 
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40%, the Conservative government   had moved a long way from the  concern of the  
Conservative Taxation Committee   in 1975  about  “awarding  a ‘payrise’ to many 
executives   just to make them work harder”. 55 The change in the highest marginal income 
tax rate was greater than that which the  Meade Committee(70%) and the Treasury (65% at 
most) in 1979 had thought likely   to have any necessary   effect on  work/leisure 
incentives.56 Whatever the justification which might be made in terms of optimal tax models, 
this pushing  back of the  perceived   redistribution function   of income taxation  not only 
drew criticism  from the political philosopher Gerry Cohen57 as offending  the  principle of  
‘justificatory  community’, a concocted notion  which required the relevant  agents to justify 
their behaviour  to the community, but it also marked a public departure   from notions of 
taxation  on the basis of ability to pay.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Like the curate’s egg, the Thatcher governments viewed the Meade Report as good in parts. 
As with the egg, this overlooked the system-based nature of the Report’s proposed reforms.58 
It also ignored the longer lifetime perspective for taxation adopted by the Meade Report. This 
opposition to adopting the longer-term time perspective of the Meade Report stemmed from 
the opposition to the temporal features of the proposed capital taxes. Allied to the Inland 
Revenue’s opposition to lifetime expenditure taxes, political emphasis could be placed on the 
shorter-term attractions of cuts in the rate of income taxation. Where top rates were reduced 
and the aspirant redistributive function of income tax curtailed, some support could be drawn 
from academic work on optimal taxation, which also diminished the importance of the 
question of taxable capacity. Important as a background to the political acceptability and 
appeal of such an approach to taxation was middling opinion which seemed receptive to the 
newspaper excerpts from popular economics books such as Britain’s Economic Problem: Too 
Few Producers, listened to  talk of  ‘trickle down’ from rich to poor and, in some political 
circles,  discussed the Laffer Curve which observed a negative correlation between rates of 
marginal tax and marginal revenue.59 The popular economics concerns at the time of the 
Meade Report’s publication and the 1979 general election were with improving incentives, 
reducing public expenditure and allowing a greater share of earnings to be kept.  
      In similar fashion to the Meade Report, the Mirrlees Review was published at a time of 
widespread dissatisfaction with the working of the economic system. However, the targets of 
that dissatisfaction had changed. Now while there was a renewed popular interest in political 
economy, the book titles (and their sub-titles especially) reflected different concerns. The 
Winner-Take-All Society: Why The Few At The Top  get So Much More  Than The Rest   of 
Us (2010), The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers   Took Their Children’s   Future: And Why 
They Should Give It  Back, and The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always 
Do Better(2009) all reflected a disquiet and dissatisfaction with the distribution of income, 
wealth and opportunity across society and between generations.60 Talk was heard again of 
wealth taxes, although such taxes found little favour with either Meade or Mirrlees. 
                                                 
55 THCR 2/6/1/35 (1975) 
56 Brown and Sandford (1990). 
57 Cohen (1992).  
58 TNA T364/149 (1978d) 
59 Bacon and Eltis (1976) 
TNA T366/380 (1978a) 
TNA T366/381 (1979a) 
60 Frank and Cook (2010) 
Willetts (2010) 
Wilkinson and Pickett(2009) 
12 
 
Inheritance Tax retained an ability to irk far in excess of its contribution to revenue, in part 
because it was perceived amenable to avoidance by the very wealthy but not by those made 
wealthy by the capital gain on their house, which as a home was comparatively illiquid. 61 
While both Meade and Mirrlees expressed dissatisfaction with Inheritance Tax, it is unlikely 
that there will be a popular groundswell in favour of an increase in its rate and incidence. In 
many ways what has re-emerged in the popular debate, as well as in the discussion of the 
papers feeding into the Mirrlees Review, is the question of what should constitute the 
household tax base.    
      Meade’s approach to determining the household tax base focussed on taxable capacity 
rather than the optimal tax theory developed by Mirrlees. 62 Meade was well aware of 
Mirrlees work on optimal tax theory. Meade’s partner in the development of national income 
accounting, Richard Stone, was officially Mirrlees’s Ph.D supervisor at Cambridge and 
Meade had copies of the examiners’ reports, by Kenneth J. Arrow and R. M Goodwin, on 
Mirrlees’s thesis on optimal accumulation under uncertainty.63  Meade wrote and distributed 
summary notes and comments on a paper on optimal taxation given by Mirrlees at an IFS  
Conference on Tax and Incentives  on 23rd  January 1976.64 While Meade was very aware of 
the elusive nature of taxable capacity he was also concerned about the use of marginal 
utilities, arguing in 1976 that ‘even if it were possible (which it is not) to devise   utility tests   
which were   not confused   with tests of attitudes   towards risks   and instabilities   of 
consumption levels, it   would  not be possible  in the real world to carry out   such a 
systematic   analysis of individual utilities’.65 Meade’s preference for taxable capacity over 
optimal taxation and indeed the Meade Report’s concern with the lifetime taxation of the use 
of wealth is arguably better in tune with public opinion now than it was in 1978. In thinking 
of lifetime rather than annual taxation and in discussing intergenerational transfers of wealth 
and opportunity, it now shares a perspective and vocabulary with those concerned with action 
to reduce the rate of climate warming. In the 1980s, the Thatcher governments implemented 
many of the Meade Report’s recommendations but conspicuously rejected those for the 
progressive lifetime taxation of wealth. Times have changed and taxation of wealth is now 
back on the lips of politicians. If the implementation of the Meade Report remains unfinished 
business, who better than the IFS to take up the cause.     
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